Urban Growth Machine by Harvey Molotch

Whatever else organizes city politics, economies, or modes of governance, dedication to growth is the main political force at work—according to the widely influential “growth machine” thesis. Growth interests, it argues, especially dominate in countries like the United States, where land and buildings operate as private markets, rather than held in common by government or some other entity; most studies have been US based but many commentaries and analyses have followed on from research elsewhere. Researchers describe pursuit of growth in payrolls, capital spending, or construction activity. As in the classic Marxian framework, such would enhance “exchange value.” In the political sphere, growth interests form up at nested scales where they pressure for advantageous zoning and public infrastructure investments at relevant administrative levels—in roads, sewer lines, and so forth. They lobby and help finance campaigns. Opposition forms up, in turn, from those whose interest in the city is primarily for home life or shared enhancements—represented by civic groups or, increasingly, environmental organizations. They strive for gains, again from the extended Marxian lexicon, in “use value”—substantive public benefits, as in health care, libraries, schools, safety, and parks. The resulting debates, studies, and applications are subjects of hundreds of articles, reviews, and books.

Conceptual Origins

The founding growth machine document was Molotch 1976, elaborated in Logan and Molotch 1976. It emerged from both the “Chicago School” of urban sociology and from the social science field of community power studies. The classics of the Chicago School bypassed problems of power, concentrating instead on the search for a science of settlement, based in geometric concepts (like central-place theory) or likening to biotic systems of natural order. Among those who followed on and who did take up the problem of power, analysts tended to split into one of two orientations—that power was held by a single group, primarily the corporate rich and their allies (the “power elite” doctrine), or alternatively that power was dispersed among competing governmental, economic, and civic groups (the “pluralist” school). A first empirical study was, somewhat idiosyncratically, provided by Floyd Hunter, a researcher trained in social work (Hunter 1953) and aligned with what was to become the growth machine position. Even more closely, conceptually, was a sociological essay, Form 1954. Political scientists, considerable in number, tended toward pluralism—as in Dahl 1961 and Banfield 1961. In contrast, works by sociologists, like Domhoff 1967, aligned with the power-elite school, as did many geographers and planning scholars, sometimes with more strongly Marxist orientations, for example Cox and Mair 1988. A number of scholars, including political scientists (Stone 1989 and Mollenkopf 1983), present more tempered conclusions. Dissenting from both pluralism and also from a traditional class-based power elite (or Marxist) position, growth machine thinking argues that although national (and global) corporate involvement is present, see Farmer and Poulos 2019 (cited under Skeptical Assessments of Growth, Case Studies), it is not the so-called capitalist class, in general, that is the most actively engaged. Instead, it is those in real estate and related business and professional groups, usually locally based, who press the growth agenda. For their part, rich people with inherited wealth, from whatever source, often have little interest in intensification of development, a point at least implicit in Domhoff 1967.

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